代写framing the SARS crisis

100%原创包过,高质量代写&免费提供Turnitin报告--24小时客服QQ&微信：273427

Introduction: framing the SARS crisis

In this media report I examine reporting by The Australian of the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory

Syndrome (SARS) crisis. SARS appeared in China in 2003, surprising global health authorities and

quickly becoming ‘truly the first international health-‐related crisis of the 21 st century (Powers,

2008: 1). It killed 774 people worldwide, mostly in China and its associated territories, leading to

1 death in Australia (WHO, 2003). Worryingly, the virus had a high fatality rate (Keil, 2011).

SARS ‘concerned everyone and could affect anyone,’ and ‘was global in the sense that it called for

international cooperation and collaboration’ (Huang & Leung, 2005: 303).

I identify the frames used in the coverage of this pandemic threat in order to identify how the

crisis was constructed for the Australian public. By comparing this coverage with previous

studies on disease framing I hope to understand how the media recycles narratives, and what

‘cultural resonances’ these might have with the Australian public. Pandemics, and the threat of

pandemics, are not new. In the last century the world experienced the 1918 Spanish Flu, the

1957 Asian Flu, and the 1968 Hong Kong Flu, the 2007 Bird Flu (H5N1) threat and, more

recently, the 2009 Swine Flu (H1N1). I argue that, similar to earlier pandemics, the prevalent

frames used to construct SARS were blame, faith in science and force of nature.

Theory

Global crises are communicated by the news media, but they are also constituted by them (Cottle,

2008: 2). The media therefore have ‘a commanding strategic position and one of considerable

communicative power’ (ibid: 76). Media framing influences how the public understands an issue

(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), and the less an audience knows about an issue, the greater this

influence becomes (Entman, 1993: 54). ‘Invisible’ risks are more open to social definition and

construction (Beck, 1992: 23), which emphasises the need to understand media reporting of

pandemic threats.

Frames are ‘schemas of interpretation’ that allow an individual to categorise and understand

their world and the occurrences in it (Goffman, 1974 in Snow & Benford, 2000: 614). However,

frames are also created by social actors to promulgate ‘a shared understanding of some

problematic condition or situation’ (Snow & Benford, 2000: 615). Framing is therefore a process

of categorisation, but it is also process of constructing meaning. Thus, Gamson (1989: 157)

contends, since facts ‘have no intrinsic meaning’, we should ‘[T]hink of news as telling stories

about the world rather than as presenting “information…”’. To frame is to ‘select some aspects of

a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to

promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or

treatment recommendation for the item described’ (Entman, 1993: 52). Framing therefore

excludes some aspects of reality and de-‐emphasises other definitions, evaluations and

recommendations. To understand the implicit story in news content requires paying attention to

omissions and inclusions (Gamson, 1989: 158). As the ‘central organising idea’ of a media

discourse (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989: 3), the overarching frame can accommodate multiple

interpretations and debates without the frame itself being challenged. The most powerful frames

become ‘a transparent description of reality’ and are therefore the hardest to detect (Kitzinger,

2007).

How society views an issue has real world implications for how they respond to it. The ‘frame or

metaphor utilized by the media to explain a disease forms the social schema by which individuals

in a society understand both the disease and the individuals who are living with the disease’

(Houston, 2008: 204). These frames can affect ‘how policies are formulated as apparently natural

and sensible responses to the issue in question’ (Kotyko et. al., 2008: 244). By identifying the

framing of pandemic threats, we may find recurring narratives and thus predict similar, ‘natural’

responses in future. We may also discover why a frame may have been chosen. Regarding this,

Gamson and Modigliani (1989) outline three influencing factors: the success of sponsors in

courting media attention; the working practices of the media; and the degree to which the frame

resonates with cultural themes. I hope to uncover these cultural resonances in order to

understand how Australians related to SARS.

Literature Review

The world has changed significantly since the pandemics of 1918, 1957 and 1968. However,

Blakely’s study of the frames applied by the New York Times to these influenza pandemics

provides a useful starting point for analysing more recent pandemic threats.

International newspapers applied different narrative frames to each pandemic, thereby

demonstrating evolutions in the social construction of influenza (Blakely, 2006: 155-‐157).

Coverage of the Spanish Flu focused on blame: of the Germans for their lifestyles, of the US

government for poor public health policies and, by emphasising the supposedly greater severity

of nonlocal influenza, of other foreign countries such as Spain. Coverage of the Asian Flu

oscillated between blame and faith in science: China brought the flu, the US produced miracle

drugs and vaccines, but US officials then failed to produce enough of them. Optimism eventually

returned as the pandemic subsided. Lastly, coverage of the Hong Kong Flu emphasised the power

of nature: rather than blaming foreigners, nature itself was responsible; man would someday

conquer influenza, but for now it was a natural occurrence and ‘an unwelcome visitor that one

just simply had to put up with’ (ibid: 157). Though we should consider these examples of blame

affixing in their post-‐WWI and Cold War contexts, these frames are still used in pandemic media

coverage today.

Stages & Characters

Media discourse of pandemic threats follows a routine pattern. Ungar (2008: 480) identifies

three stages: ‘sounding the alarm’, ‘mixed messages’ and ‘hot crisis and containment’.

Throughout the coverage of H5N1 in the UK, discourses of panic, unpredictability and alarm were

moderated by reassuring mixed messages of faith in science (or ‘preparedness’ and ‘medical

promise’), resulting in ‘more mutations in the coverage than in the virus itself’ (ibid: 492).

Holland (2008: 659) found that H1N1 coverage went through similar stages, but observed an

additional beyond containment theme, which is perhaps unsurprising given that H1N1 became a

‘hot crisis’ but H5N1 did not.

Different actors may be portrayed according to reductive frames. Wagner-‐Egger et. al. (2011)

applied a dramaturgical framework to the H1N1 pandemic to identify which actors the Swiss

public viewed as heroes, villains and victims. They found that the heroes tended to be scientists,

physicians and often health experts. We can also link this to the disease detective frame (Ungar,

2008: 475) that appears during the early crisis stages, and which involves tracking down

individual cases of transmission. Importantly, a detective necessarily involves a ‘crime’, which

risks the stigmatisation of those carrying a disease or virus. Respondents viewed saw developing

nations, such as Mexico, as victims. But while victims ‘are to be pitied for their plight[, they] are

also dangerous because they can potentially carry the disease’ (Wagner-‐Egger et. al., 2011: 474-‐

475).

Drama

Moeller (1999: 59) argues that coverage of disease is based on drama. Drama is manufactured by

highlighting the deficiencies of the power of science. Media frames thus emphasise the novel and

devastating nature of disease, and the risks of a disease reaching the audience (ibid: 62). For

example, the British press dramatised H5N1 by focusing on fatalities, spread and the chance of

mutation, creating the impression that ‘a monster virus [was] coming’ (Ungar, 2008: 493). And

the Australian media paired the ‘“novelty” of [H1N1]…with references to its lethality’, giving ‘the

overall impression that swine flu was imminent, unavoidable, capable of unknown proportions,

and [had] pandemic potential’ (Holland et. al., 2012: 659). Scientific experts and respected

government officials set the dominant frame (ibid: 658), and even labelling a disease affects the

level of drama that follows. When SARS was labelled an emerging infectious disease, the media

‘located it among the set of pathogens – including HIV/AIDS, Ebola…and others – that have

emerged as threats to global health since the early 1980s, fracturing confidence in Western

medicine’s therapeutic efficacy’ (Wallis & Nerlich, 2005: 2630).

Anxiety, Responsibility & Blame

Prior to H1N1, recent influenza viruses did not elicit intense fear or anxiety. The low death toll of

the 1957 and 1968 pandemics meant that ‘for decades influenza had occupied the “dull but

worthy” category of infectious diseases’ (Abraham, 2011: 797-‐8). But government attitudes have

responded to globalisation, modernisation and terrorism with an ‘emerging diseases worldview’

(King, 2002). Developed nations fear that ‘“centres” might be contaminated by “peripheries”’

(ibid: 772) as territoriality is eroded, and that therefore disease risks must be managed globally

through ‘de-‐territorialized networks in which information is collected, managed, assembled and

disseminated’ (ibid: 768). 1 Through the mass media, the public also has never been more aware

of the threat posed by emerging and re-‐emerging infectious diseases (IED) (Joffe, 2013: 447).

EIDs can travel quickly because of international travel and densely populated cities, giving rise to

Risk Society fears (Washer, 2011: 506). Wilkins (2011 in ibid) demonstrates how rural Malaysian

communities believed the H1N1 pandemic resulted from urban lifestyles. Further, pandemics are

often portrayed in the media as an inevitable part of modern life (Ungar, 2008: 482).

Anxiety regarding EID risks and globalisation is closely linked with blame or responsibility and

‘othering’. Blame allows ‘for the social understanding and ordering of disease in a way which

presumes the integrity of one’s own self-‐management…by holding another group responsible’

(Abeysinghe et. al., 2011: 312). Australian coverage of H5N1 in 2007 focused on the individual

responsibility of nations playing their part. By framing stories according to ‘the contemporary

individualisation of risk’ (ibid: 311-‐312), the press portrayed equally under-‐prepared nations in

two different lights: developing nations ‘constantly undermined’ global efforts, while developed

nations ‘struggled valiantly’ to catch up. Blame was justified through the narrative of globalised

interdependence, because it ‘render[ed] the actions of other nations as a valid subject of our own

concern’ (Abeysinghe et. al., 2011: 315). Expecting the next pandemic to emerge from

somewhere distant, developed nations demand a global response to protect its citizens at home

(Abraham, 2011: 798). But the media is ethically obligated to provide information to the public

about the risks of disease, and to evaluate the performance of health institutions in mitigating its

effects (Wilkins, 2005). Therefore, though blame is applied across borders, we might also expect

it to apply to governments at home.

Method

SARS was a problem with national and international, rather than local, significance. I therefore

analysed articles from The Australian, the most highly circulated of only two national Australian

newspapers. Using the Factiva database I searched for all articles published in The Australian

during 2003 containing the term ‘SARS’. I then graphed the results to the isolate peak period,

which was 20 March to 8 May 2009. After removing articles where SARS was not the main focus,

this left approximately 103 articles. I read each of these and sought out common themes, which

are explored below.

Analysis

Early SARS coverage applied a detective frame, which quickly gave way to panic. SARS is

depicted as a ‘mystery microbe’ and suspected victims are ‘under investigation’ [x]. These early

articles were written by The Australian’s science writer, and are not dramatised. Rather than

associating SARS with pandemics and plagues, the writer equated it with familiar, easily cured

1 A clear response to this was the creation of WHO’s lobal Outbreak and Response Network (GOARN). Also,

in 2006, governments around the world acknowledged that ‘a pandemic could potentially kill millions and

cause catastrophic consequences’ (Beijing Declaration, 2006; see also Abraham, 2011).

viruses such as measles and the common cold’ [xi]. But five days later, ‘global health authorities

[were] struggling to contain’ its spread [xx]. Even doctors were susceptible to the virus (ibid),

and health experts warned there was ‘no cure, no test to diagnose the illness, and researchers are

not…certain of what causes the virus’ [xxi]. This ‘mystery killer’ theme was consistently used to

emphasis the novelty of SARS, highlighting the deficiencies of science and therefore promoting

the drama frame.

Drama was maximised by the rising numbers of infected people, but also through the historical

tension between faith in science and the power of nature. SARS was an occupying force in Beijing

and rural China. Beijing became ‘a ghost city of empty freeways, shuttered shops and citizens

cowering indoors,’ [ii] and villagers faced an ‘onslaught’ [xxiii] from an ‘invisible foe’ [iii].

Meanwhile, Australia was ‘spared’ [xxiv] and ‘escape[d]’ [xii] the virus. SARS was thus portrayed

through the force of nature frame, somewhere between radiation and war; as if it were a spectre

that Australia could only monitor and, at best, outlast. Despite the ominous message that ‘there

will be more’ epidemics [ix], Australians were also told that SARS was causing ‘mass hysteria’

[xix] and was not a significant risk thanks to the Communicable Diseases Network Australia

[xxiv]. Science and disease monitoring would protect Australians, and this tension with the force

of nature demonstrates Ungar’s (2008) mixed messages, as authorities attempted to explain the

risks while keeping the public calm.

Frames of heroes, victims and villains were frequently applied. Detectives and drama provided the

basis for framing heroes. These were the Hong Kong scientists whose ‘remarkable and

unprecedented’ work established the link between SARS and the coronavirus [xiv]. But with the

exception of Vietnam, who contained the virus during this period, nations were not depicted as

heroes. It is unsurprising that scientists were the heroes, given that they were almost always the

main interviewees. Occasionally Chinese doctors or villagers were interviewed to demonstrate

how the government was failing them. The biggest victims were economies [v], with a large

volume of articles focusing on particular industries and business owners; for example: real estate

[xv], airlines and airports [vi, vii, viii] or financial markets [xvi]. Consistent with the findings of

Houston et. al. (2008: 217), stories of individual victims were less frequent, and the severity of

the disease was obscured by figures.

Discourses of blame and global interdependence were especially prevalent in SARS coverage. The

Chinese government was undoubtedly the villain, having ‘covered-‐up’ the extent of contagion in

China, revealing themselves ‘as globalisation’s “weak link” where disease-‐control is concerned,’

[xxii] and ‘[giving] a disease to the world’ [i]. China, it was assumed, could never contain the virus

on its own, and a message reinforced by stories of villagers disinfecting buses and schools in a

futile, unscientific effort to arrest the spread. Statements such as ‘[e]ffectively WHO has no

jurisdiction over individual countries’ implied that the actions of foreign governments, and the

especially of the Chinese government, were our concern. Rather than simply being unprepared,

Beijing was frequently depicted as being guilty of thwarting international efforts, putting its

image above international security and finally ‘admitting to’ further deaths and infections [xxiii].

In contrast to China, Australia dutifully reported its one case of SARS to WHO (ibid), and ‘[did] its

bit by playing host to SARS experts from 40 countries next week in Melbourne’ [xxiii].

Interestingly, while Australia’s responsibility was to monitor and report, China was expected to

exploit its authoritarian governmental system and quickly enforce quarantining [xxii];

centralised authority became a positive thing during this crisis. The Australian government was

not interviewed aside from its state leaders, giving the impression that it was not Australia’s

concern, and neither the adequacy of its preventative measure nor the efficacy of quarantining in

general were questioned. There was a general contradiction in that the world faced a global

threat, but that individual nations must fend for themselves – though, as noted, heroic scientists

were collaborating internationally. And, though it can be argued that criticism of Chinese controls

was ethical (Wilkins, 2005), this test was not applied to other governments.

Future risk became a prominent topic in this coverage. ‘Super-‐carriers’ were discussed, but

generally not in terms of individual blame or stigma. Rather, super-‐carriers were likely to start

the next phase of contagion [xxvii]. This ‘next phase’ idea was revisited when scientists revealed

that SARS could survive for 28 days outside the body [xviii]. By 12 April, reporters were already

discussing the how the lessons learned from this crisis could be applied to ‘the big one’ [iv],

illustrating both the existence of the emerging diseases worldview and the need to create news

through drama.

Conclusion

The Australian created drama and mixed messages by applying the opposing frames of faith in

science and SARS as a force of nature. This is similar to coverage of earlier pandemics, and shows

how depictions of pandemic threats have not evolved a great deal. However, this dramatic

framing was exacerbated by the emerging diseases and risk worldviews. The public is now

anticipating ‘the big one’, which provides an easy narrative for describing future risks.

Blame stemming from individual responsibility was regularly applied to China. The Australian

was heavily critical of the actions of the Chinese government, but appeared to unquestioningly

assume that Australia’s preparations and were adequate. This is contra to the idea that the virus

is a spectre that needs to be outlasted. Further, Australia was doing its duty by monitoring the

disease, though it was not depicted as offering any assistance to China. Its apparent

uninvolvement, whilst expecting Chinese cooperation, seems incongruous with a global threat.

Depictions of China as a villain implied that the nation was scientifically backward, which may

resonate with Australian’s perceptions of China as underdeveloped and somehow deserving of

SARS. Viewing the country as an authoritarian villain is made easier by its central government,

the few interviews with sufferers and the imagery of deserted streets, whereby Beijing – rather

than people – is the victim. Generally, however, the victim was the economy. The economy affects

Australia more than the suffering of Chinese citizens, and may demonstrate the self-‐interested

nature of Australians and their psychological distance from foreign ‘others’. That heroes were

individuals only reinforces the idea that the Chinese state has failed, and that only the power of

science and scientists can protect us from pandemics.

Bibliography

Abeysinghe, S. & White, K. (2011) ‘The avian infuenza pandemic: Discourses of risk, contagion

and preparation in Australia’ Health, Risk & Society June, Vol. 13, No. 4; pp 311-‐326

Abraham, T. (2011) ‘The Chronicle of a Disease Foretold: Pandemic H1N1 and the Construction of

a Global Health Security Theat’ Political Studies Vol. 59; pp 191-‐812

Angeli, E. (2012) ‘Metaphors in the Rhetoric of Pandemic Flu: Electronic Media Coverage of H1N1

and Swine Flu’, Journal of Technical Writing and Communication, Vol. 42(3); pp 203-‐222

Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Sage: London

Beijing Declaration (2006) Beijing Declaration at the International Pledging Conference on Avian

and Human Pandemic Influenza, 18 January

http://ec.europa.eu/world/avian_influenza/docs/06_05_beijing_declar_060118.pdf [accessed 20

April 2013]

Blakely, D. E. (2006) Mass Mediated Disease: A case study of three flu pandemics and public health

policy Rowman & Littlefield: New York

Chang, K., Salmon, C., Lee, B., Choi, J. & Zeldes, G (2004) ‘The influence of contextual factors on

media framing: a cross-‐national study of news coverage of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome

(SARS)’ Conference Papers from the International Communication Association, 2004 Annual

Meeting, p1, 27p

Cottle, S. (2008) Global Crisis Reporting: Journalism in the Global Age. Maidenhead: Open

University Press

Entman, R. (1993) ‘Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm’ Journal of

Communication 43(4): 51-‐58

Gamson, W. (1989) ‘News as Framing: Comments on Graber’ American Behavioral Scientist Vol.

33, No. 2; pp 157-‐161

Gamson, W. & Modigliani, A. (1989) ‘Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A

Constructionist Approach’ American Journal of Sociology Vol. 95, No. 1: pp 1-‐37

Hilton, H. & Hunt, K. (2011) ‘UK newspapers’ representations of the 2009-‐10 outbreak of swine

flu: one health scare not over-‐hyped by the media?’ Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health

Iss. 65: pp 9461-‐946

Holland, K., Blood, W., Imison, M., Chapman, S. & Fogarty, A. (2012) ‘Risk, expert uncertainty, and

Australian news media: public and private faces of expert opinion during the 2009 swine flu

pandemic’ Journal of Risk Research 15:6, pp. 657-‐671

Houston et. al. (2008) ‘Newspaper coverage of the 2003 SARS outbreak’ in Powers, J. H. & Xiano,

X. (eds), The Social Construction of SARS John Benjamins Publishing: Philadelphia

Huang, Y. & Leung, C. (2005) ‘Western-‐Led Press Coverage of Mainland China and Vietnam during

the SARS Crisis: Reassessing the Concept of ‘Media Representation of the Other’’ Asian Journal of

Communication Vol. 15, No. 3: pp 302-‐318

Joffe, H. (2011) ‘Public apprehensions of emerging infectious diseases: are changes afoot?’ Public

Understanding of Science 20: 446

Keil, U., Schonhofer, P. & Spelsberg, A. (2011) ‘The invention of the swine-‐flu pandemic’ European

Journal of Epidemiology Vol. 26: 187-‐90

King, N. B. (2002) ‘Security, Disease, Commerce: Ideologies of Postcolonial Global Health’ Social

Studies of Science Oct-‐Dec, Vol. 32; pp. 763–789

Kitzinger, J. (2007) ‘Framing and Frame Analysis’ in E. Devereux (ed) Media Studies: Key Issues

and Debates. London: Sage

Kotyko, N., Brown, B. & Crawford, P. (2008) ‘The dead parrot and the dying swan: the role of

metaphor scenarios in UK press coverage of Avian Flu in the UK in 2005-‐2006’ Metaphor and

Symbol Iss. 23: 242-‐261

Moeller, S. D. (1999) ‘Covering Pestilence: Sensationalizing Epidemic Disease’ in Compassion

Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death London: Routledge

Shih, T., Wijaya, R. & Brossard, D. (2008) ‘Media Coverage of Public Health Epidemics: Linking

Framing and Issue Attention Cycle Toward an Integrated Theory of Print News Coverage of

Epidemics’ Mass Communication & Society Vol. 11: pp 141-‐160

Snow, D. & Benford, R. (2000) ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: an Overview and

Assessment’ Annual Review of Sociology Iss. 26: 611-‐639

Ungar, S. (2008) ‘Global bird flu communication: hot crisis and media reassurance’ Science

Communication 29: 472

Washer, P. (2011) ‘Lay perceptions of emerging infectious diseases: a commentary’ Public

Understanding of Science 20(4): 506

Wagner-‐Egger, P., Bangerter, A., Gilles, I., Green, E., Rigaud, D., Krings, F., Staerkle, C. & Clemence,

A. (2011) ‘Lay perceptions of collectives at the outbreak of the H1N1 epidemic: heroes, villains

and victims’ Public Understanding of Science 20(4): 461-‐47

WHO (2003) ‘Summary of probable SARS cases with onset of illness from 1 November 2002 to 31

July 2003’ WHO: Global Alert and Response (31 December)

http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table2004_04_21/en/index.html [accessed 18 April

2013]

WHO (2009) ‘Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 -‐ update 76’ WHO: Global Alert and Response (27

November) http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_11_27a/en/index.html [accessed 18 April 2013]

Index of Articles in The Australian

i. Armitage, C. (2003c) ‘The doctor who gave a disease to the world’ The Australian, 5 April

ii. Armitage, C. (2003a) ‘SARS the shadow of death in ghost city’ The Australian, 28 April

iii. Armitage, C. (2003b) ‘Villagers mount blockades for an invisible foe’ The Australian, 3 May

iv. Armitage, C. & Korporaal, G. (2003) ‘DEADLY SERIOUS’ The Australian, 12 April

v. Creedy, S., Korporaal, G. & Armitage, C. (2003) ‘Epidemic threatens regional economy’ The

Australian, 9 April

vi. Creedy, S. (2003a) ‘Airline's job losses inevitable with so many clouds on horizon’ The Australian,

10 April

vii. Creedy, S. (2003b) ‘Airports brace for a paucity of passengers’ The Australian, 23 April

viii. Creedy, S. & Harvey, C. (2003) ‘Wary Qantas pulls in its wings’ The Australian, 24 April

ix. Curson, P. (2003) ‘Our lifestyles help germs to thrive’ The Australian, 3 April

x. Dayton, L. (2003a) ‘HK hotel cited as source of flu bug’ The Australian, 21 March

xi. Dayton, L. (2003b) ‘SARS may be common cold mutant, say US scientists’ The Australian, 26 March

xii. Dayton, L. (2003c) ‘Australia to escape SARS epidemic’ The Australian, 4 April

代写framing the SARS crisis